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GOD AS TRUTH 
John Peterson 
The view of Aristotle and Brentano that 'true' applies straightforwardly to 
statements (judgments, beliefs, propositions) and derivatively to other things 
makes for awkward and unintuitive definitions in the cases of derived truth. 
This is corrected by construing 'true' as applying analogically to statements 
and other things. Under this view, six senses of 'true' are distinguished. 
Following the logic of analogy, these senses are partly the same and partly 
different. These six senses also exhibit an analogy of proportionality. This 
yields three groups, paired as follows: moral truth is to sentenial truth as 
productive truth is to ontological truth as cultural truth is to lawful truth. 
But behind every analogical prediction is a derivative predication. This 
implies that there is a primary referent of 'true' behind moral, productive and 
cultural truth on the one hand and sentential, ontological and lawful truth on 
the other. In the case of the former three, it is evidently the human mind. In 
the case of the latter three, a reasonable hypothesis, shared by Aquinas, is that 
it is God's mind. 
Many philosophers hold that being true is a relation of correspondence, 
conformity or agreement between thought and reality. If and only if it is a 
fact that grass is green is the proposition (judgment, statement, belief) that 
grass is green true. But though they agree in this, they differ both as to the 
terms of that relation and as to the nature of the relation itself. And so 
their agreement is often vacuous. Some, like Aquinas and Locke, construe 
the thought that conforms to reality as a mental sign, an ens rationis. Wary 
of psychologism, others, like Frege, identify thought with object of thought 
as opposed to any mental entity. Still others, like Quine, Strawson and 
many contemporary philosophers, identify thought here with either a sen-
tence or the assertive use of a sentence. 
There is also disagreement about the other end of the relation, reality. 
Often it is identified with a fact. But even here there is difference. Logical 
atomists, for instance, say that, like the simple statements that express 
them, elementary or atomic facts live in splendid isolation. Opposing this 
atomism, holists claim that anyone fact is made what it is by its relation to 
every other fact. That means that, taken in and of itself, the isolated fact 
that makes thought true is partial reality and hence that the thought in 
question is true only to a degree. Thus, while Truth with a capital 'T' is 
identified with the whole of reality ("Die Wahrheit ist das ganze," says 
Hegel), a thought's being (to a degree) true is a matter of its conforming to 
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some partial reality. 
But despite these as well as other differences, most agree that to say 
thought is true is to say it corresponds to reality. Truth is said to be a rela-
tion between two things and not either a thing itself or some quality or 
attribute of a thing. 
In what follows it is argued that this relational view of truth confuses an 
effect of truth with the definition of truth. Where there is truth there is cor-
respondence of thought and reality and vice versa. Thus, truth is equivalent 
to a relation of correspondence. But from this it does not follow nor is it 
the case that truth is defined in terms of that relation. By analogy, where 
there are persons there is the capacity to laugh and vice versa. But the 
capacity to laugh does not enter into the definition of a person. It is the 
effect of the definition of a person as a rational animal. Truth is found pri-
marily not in the conformity of thought and reality but in the ultimate 
source or measure of that conformity. That means that, in relation to that 
source, propositions (judgments, statements, beliefs) are called true in a 
derived sense. They are not strictly speaking true but are called true 
because they conform to truth. In this they are analogous to blood sam-
ples. The latter are not themselves healthy but are called healthy only 
because they are the effect of health. As it is the source of healthy blood, an 
animal, in which health is properly and primarily found, so too it is the 
ultimate source or measure of true propositions (and other things) in 
which truth is primarily found. And this source or measure, at least so far 
as non-human truth is concerned, is God. In this way, truth follows being. 
A thing has truth in the same way it has being, say Aristotle and Aquinas.1 
As things other than God are said to be only because being is first found in 
God, things other than God are called true only because truth is first found 
in God. 
When propositions and other things are called true because they con-
form to truth, there are in this relation of conformity two things. There is 
that which conforms, x, and that to which it conforms, y. And there is that 
feature or state in respect to which x conforms to y, call it F. What I con-
tend is that truth is found by priority in y and in a posterior way in x. 
Moreover, the relation between x and y is always one of composite to sim-
ple. What conforms, x, is always some instantiation of F. It is the complex 
of F-as-embodied-in-something. But that to which x conforms, y, is, in rela-
tion to x, something simple. It is not F as instantiated in things but F con-
sidered apart from things in mind as ideal standard or measure. 
I 
'True' is said to apply primarily to statements (judgments, beliefs, 
propositions) and secondarily to everything else. Since the latter are not 
straightforwardly called true but are called true only by reference to true 
statements, to which they bear some relation, 'true' is said to be predicated 
of these non-statements in a derived or pros hen sense. Originating in 
Aristotle and reinforced in modern times bv Brentand, this view may be 
called the reductionist view of 'true' (hereafter, RV). Modern logicians ~ho 
flaunt their disagreement with Aristotle on matters like the square of oppo-
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sition and existential import join hands with The Philosopher when it 
comes to accepting RV. 
Under RV all metaphysical, epistemological or ethical senses of 'true' 
are derived from and hence reduced to the logical sense of 'true.' This ele-
vates logic and diminishes metaphysics in the sense that being is only ellip-
tically said to be true in the classic scholastic formula that being is one, true 
and good. It also excludes any irreducible ethical truth such as 
Kierkegaard's subjective truth. For under RV when it is said that a per-
son's life or actions exemplify truth or that he or she lives and moves in the 
truth 'truth' must always be used in an extended sense. Further, when in 
epistemic context ideas, concepts, beliefs, judgments or other entia ration is 
are called true, it is once again assumed, following RV, that 'true' is predi-
cated derivatively of these entities. This is reinforced by the specter of psy-
chologism. Lest they invite this error, philosophers eschew predicating 
'true' straightforwardly of ideas, judgments, beliefs or any other mental 
acts or entities. So when it comes to truth, metaphysics, ethics and episte-
mology borrow from logic. Their use of 'truth' and 'true' is always 
derived. In every case it comes with a string attached and on the other end 
of the string is the narrowly logical sense of 'true.' 
To spell out RV, consider first the definition of derivative or pros hen 
predication. 
OP 
For any predicate G, G is attributed to something derivatively or 
pros hen just when the sense of G is different from, but nonethe-
less includes, both the primary sense and referent of G. 
Expressions like 'false gold' or 'true diamond' exemplify OF. Under RV 
and OP, iron pyrite, for example, is called false gold only because it gives 
rise to a statement that fails to correspond to reality, i.e., 'This is gold.' And 
something is called a true diamond only because it gives rise to a statement 
that does correspond to reality, i.e., 'This is a diamond.' Following tradi-
tion, let us call those cases in which 'true' is applied to things like gold 
nuggets and diamonds ontological truth (OT). 
Note that OT refers not only to natural things but also to natural 
processes. Surveying his wheat crop in a normal season, a farmer says that 
its course is true. By this he means that, unless something unexpected hap-
pens, the crop will reach its natural final end. Gynecologists likewise speak 
of the development of a fetus as being uneventful or true to course. Under 
RV, the course of the crop or the fetus is called true only in a derived sense, 
i.e., only because it is the ground of the true statement, "The crop (or fetus) 
is on target." This derived, teleological sense of 'true' as applied to natural 
events also appears in language describing non-natural events. These are 
events that are initiated by us. When we think it will strike its target, we 
say of an arrow or golf ball that its course is true. And assuming RV and 
OP, the arrow or ball's flight is so characterized only because it is the 
ground of the true statement, "The arrow (or ball) is on target." 
But focusing on OT, we can say that this secondary sense of 'true' exem-
plifies OP. For the sense of 'true' here includes both the primary sense and 
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referent of 'true.' And so we can call cases in which 'true' is (secondarily) 
predicated of natural things and processes ontological truth (OT) and cases 
in which 'true' is (primarily) predicated of statements (judgments, proposi-
tions) sentential truth (ST). Thus we have, 
ST 
A statement t is true just when t corresponds to reality. 
OT 
A natural thing or process n is called true only because n is the 
ground of the correspondence of a statement about n to reality. 
If OP is assumed, it is evident that all predications in OT are derivative. 
They are secondary senses of 'true' which are derivative of ST the primary 
sense of 'true.' For though the sense of OT is different from that of ST, the 
sense of OT includes both the primary sense and referent of ST. 
Other examples show what derivative predication comes to. Suppose a 
person and an event are called sad. It is evident that the former is called 
sad in the primary sense of the term and the latter is called sad in a derived 
or secondary sense. As predicated of a person, 'sad' means, "being in a 
state of dejection" but as predicated of an event 'sad' means, "conducive to 
a person's being in a state of dejection." Again, suppose an animal and 
blood are called healthy. The former is so called in the primary sense of 
the term and the latter is called healthy in a secondary sense of the term. 
As predicated of an animal 'healthy' means, "being in a state of physical 
well-being," while, as predicated of blood, 'healthy' means, "being a sign 
of an animal being in a state of physical well-being." These examples fol-
low OP. Both the primary sense and referent of 'sad' and 'healthy' are 
included, respectively, in the secondary senses of 'sad' and 'healthy.' 
As 'sad' in 'sad event' and 'healthy' in 'healthy blood' exemplify OP, so 
too, apparently, does ~T. For it can be said that what is meant by calling 
something true gold is that it "gives rise to a statement (e.g., 'This is gold') 
that corresponds to reality." So it in ST, its primary sense, 'true' means 
"corresponds to reality," then it is evident that "gives rise to a statement 
that corresponds to reality" includes both the primary sense and referent 
of 'true.' Therefore, no less than with 'sad event' and 'healthy blood' in 
relation to 'sad' and 'healthy/ respectively, 'true gold/ 'true diamond,' 
and all other instances of OT in relation to 'true' exemplify OP, given the 
assumption of RV. 
But besides OT, other supposed secondary senses of 'true' may be dis-
tinguished. That means that, if RV is true, the latter must also be derivative 
of ST and so exemplify OP. Otherwise, RV must be abandoned. These 
other senses of 'true' include moral truth (MT), productive truth (PT), cul-
tural truth (CT) and lawful truth (LT). I consider MT first. 
MT involves the conformity of a person's statement to his or her own 
beliefs. A celebrated example of moral falsity is Pablo's lie in Sartre's The 
Wall.' There Pablo tells the falangists that Ramon Gris is hiding in the 
gravedigger's shack, even though Pablo disbelieves this is so. He deliber-
ately misleads the falangists in order to laugh at them as they scurry to the 
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shack to capture Gris. But as the story goes, it turns out that Gris is in the 
gravedigger's shack. Pablo's statement is thus both true in the primary 
sense and false in a secondary sense. Though it is ST true, it is MT false. 
For what Pablo says fails to conform to what he believes. 
A similar case is one in which one's statement fails to correspond both 
to reality and to one's knowledge. Suppose I am not in pain but to gain 
some advantage say that I am in pain. My statement is then both ST and 
MT false. The difference between this case and the case of belief is that in 
the case of knowledge a statement that conforms to my knowledge that P 
must also conform to reality while a statement that conforms to one of my 
beliefs may not conform to reality. And this is because knowledge but not 
belief entails truth. 
In any case, if MT is a secondary, derived sense of 'true,' then, by DP, the 
primary sense and referent of 'true' are included in the sense of MT. And a 
case can be made for this. To call a person's statement MT true is to say that 
it corresponds to the person's belief that what the statement in question 
expresses corresponds to reality. Thus we get, assuming RV and DP, 
MT 
A statement t of a person s is called true only because t expresses 
s's belief that t corresponds to reality. 
In the example cited, Pablo's statement that Gris is in the gravedigger's 
shack fails to satisfy MT. For contravening MT, Pablo's statement does not 
express a belief on Pablo's part that this statement corresponds to reality. 
Examples aside, note that MT follows OT in exemplifying DP. The sense 
of MT, just like the sense of OT, includes both the primary sense and refer-
ent of 'true.' This shows that, just as is the case in OT, a case can be made 
for saying that MT is derivative of ST. 
Next, consider PT. PT involves the conformity of a product or human-
initiated process to the producer's conceptual model or know-how. It 
includes all arts, crafts, and skills. A sculptor who is disappointed in the 
cut of his statue may try again, calling his first attempt a false start and his 
second effort "the true one." He knows the first try falls short of his ideal. 
Or suppose a singer knows the song she sings does not measure up to her 
ability to sing the song. She may then break it off, informing her accompa-
nist that she made a false start. If PT is derivative of ST, then, by DP, the 
primary sense and referent of ST are included in the sense of PT. And once 
again, a case can be made for this. For it may be said that to call a certain 
artefact PT true is to say that it is the ground of the correspondence of the 
artisan's statement, "This corresponds to my ideal model," to reality. 
Assuming RV and DP, we then get, 
PT 
A product or performance r of an artisan s is called true only 
because r is the ground of the correspondence of the statement, 
/lr conforms to s's ideal model," to reality. 
And here it is clear that, for the third time and following DP, the prima-
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ry sense and referent of 'true' are included in one of the secondary, derived 
senses of 'true.' PT is different from but nonetheless includes the primary 
sense and referent of ST. 
Still further, there is what may be called cultural truth (CT). This involves 
the conformity of a person's behavior to some custom or law of society. 
Stopping at a red traffic light conforms to the law to that effect in our soci-
ety. But the conforming action in cultural truth need not be legal. It may be 
customary only. Thus, my shaking hands with the person to whom I am 
introduced conforms to a long-standing custom in our society. All forms of 
what is currently referred to as "political correctness" fall under this head-
ing. Under the assumption of RV and DP we then get the following: 
CT 
An action c of a person s is called true only because c is the 
ground of the correspondence of the statement, "c conforms to a 
law or custom of the society to which s belongs," to reality. 
As it is with aT, MT, and PT, so is it with CT, at least if DP and RV are 
assumed. That is to say, the sense of CT includes both the primary sense 
and referent of ST. 
Finally, there is what was previously called lawful truth (LT). This is the 
conformity of events or activities to some non-societal or objective law. 
Thus, we say that the free fall of an object conforms to Galileo's law of 
acceleration or that an observed expansion of gas exemplifies Boyle's law. 
Before modern science (as for example, with the scholastics) natural laws 
are construed teleologically. For example, the activities in a tadpole are 
directed to their end, the mature frog, by the law of its nature. At each 
stage in the tadpole's development it is said that the changes that occur in 
the tadpole are "true to" the law of its nature. On the other hand, an errant 
event is one that is not true to law. In Epicurus' system, for example, cer-
tain atoms are not true to the law of atomic motion just because they 
swerve. Nor is LT necessarily confined to science or philosophy of nature. 
Just in case there are objective moral laws, a person's behavior may be 
characterized as being ethically true, i.e., true or correct because it con-
forms to objective moral law. And so, once again under the assumption of 
RV and Dr, we get the following: 
LT 
An activity y, is called true only because y is the ground of the 
correspondence of the statement, "y conforms to an objective 
law," to reality. 
II 
aT, MT, PT, CT and LT are noticeably contrived. In the case of aT, it is 
more straightforward to call natural things and processes true simply 
because they conform to some pattern. As for PT, it is more natural to 
define a true artefact as one that conforms to the artist's ideal model. In the 
case of MT, it is easier to define a (morally) true statement simply as one 
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that conforms to the stater's beliefs. And as regards CT, it is simpler to 
define true or correct actions as those that conform to some law or custom. 
And as for LT, it is more straightforward to call lawlike events true because 
they conform to law. The appeal of these cleaner definitions casts suspicion 
on what spawns the prolixity of OT, MT, PT, CT and LT to begin with, 
namely, RV. This calls for an alternative to RV. 
One such alternative is this. Instead of construing aT, MT, PT, CT and 
LT as secondary senses of 'true' that have been derived from ST, the prima-
ry sense, let us divide the six senses into two pairs, MT', PT' and CT' on one 
side and ST', aT' and L T' on the other. Note the advantage that these defin-
itions hold over their foregoing counterparts so far as simplicity goes. Thus, 
MT' 
One's statement is true just when it conforms to one's beliefs. 
PT' 
A human product or performance is true just when it conforms 
to the maker's or doer's ideal. 
CT' 
One's action is true just when it conforms to a custom 
or law of one's society. 
ST' 
A statement is true just when it conforms to a fact. 
aT' 
A natural thing or process is true just because it conforms to its 
model. 
LT' 
An activity is true just when it conforms to objective law. 
MT', PT' and CT' form one group and ST', aT' and LT' make up the 
other. The division turns on whether the measure of the conformity always 
depends on us or not. In the first group, we are the measure in every case 
while in the second group the measure is almost always independent of us. 
It may for that reason be said that MT', PT' and CT' are subjective while 
ST', aT' and LT' are objective. 
In MT' the measure or standard of the conformity is a belief and a belief 
depends on us. When I assert that P, this is MT' true provided that I 
believe P, regardless of whether or not P squares with reality. But ordinari-
ly, P is ST' true provided that P conforms to a fact, regardless of whether 
anyone believes P or not. The exception is a statement like, 'I believe it is 
raining.' Since this statement is ST' true provided that I believe it is rain-
ing, the measure here does depend on us. Succinctly, the difference 
between MT' and ST' truth comes to this: when I assert that P, this is MT' 
true iff I believe P; it is ST' true iff P. Thus, when I say 'It is raining' this is 
MT' true iff I believe it is raining; it is ST' true if it is raining. So if I say 'I 
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believe it is raining' this is MT' true iff I believe that I believe it is raining; 
it is ST' true iff I believe it is raining: 
In PT' the measure of the conformity is a pattern in the mind of the 
maker or doer. So PT' truth again depends on us. In the previous example, 
our disappointed sculptor abandons his first try and begins anew, hoping 
that his second start will conform to his ideal pattern. But in the counter-
part of PT', namely, OT', a natural thing conforms to its pattern, and so is 
true, regardless of whether or not it jibes with any artist's model. 
As for CT', since the measure of the conformity here is a conventional 
law or custom, CT' truth also depends on us. To the extent that I slow 
down when approaching a reduced speed area, my action is correct in the 
sense of being true to, or conforming to, the law. But in L T', the counter-
part of CT', the behavior of my vehicle conforms or is true to the laws of 
physics regardless of whether or not it conforms or is true to the laws of 
trafficking. Depending on how fast I drive, the distance I must cover before 
reaching the lower speed limit may or may not coincide with the area of 
reduced speed. And so, while the measure in PT' and CT' always depends 
on us, the measure in their counterparts, OT' and LT', never depends on us. 
So between each member in the first group of three and its correspond-
ing member in the second group of three an analogy of proportionality 
obtains. Thus, MT' is to ST' as PT' is to OT' as CT' is to LT'. In each one of 
these three pairs, truth is measure of something else. That is the element of 
identity in the analogy. But the difference is that the type of measure varies 
in the three pairs. In MT' and ST', truth is measure in the sense of ground of 
what is said. Morally speaking, since Pablo disbelieves his own statement 
that Gris is hiding in the gravedigger's shack, his statement is morally 
false. Yet, since his statement conforms to reality, it is sententially true. In 
PT' and OT' truth is measure in the sense of a pattern after which something is 
made. Just in case Michaelangelo's Pieta conforms to his ideal model, it is 
artistically true. And because the rock out of which the Pieta is hewn is 
really marble and not some imitation, the Pieta qua natural object (as 
opposed to qua artefact) conforms to the Idea of marble. And just to that 
extent is it ontologically true. Finally, in CT' and L T' truth is measure in 
the sense of a rule or law according to which something occurs. Just to the 
extent that my son's behavior at dinner finally conforms to the rules of 
American etiquette, it is culturally true or correct behavior. And just to the 
extent that the rock I drop accelerates at thirty-two feet per second per sec-
ond, the behavior of the rock is true to Galileo's law of free fall. 
In any event, the analogy of proportionality that holds between MT' 
and ST', PT' and OT' and CT' and L T' implies a narrower analogy of attri-
bution between the first member of anyone of these three pairs and the 
first member of any other pair. In MT' and PT' 'true' applies partly in the 
same sense and partly in a different sense. The sameness consists in the 
idea of conformity to a measure. But the difference comes from the non-
identity of the terms of that relation in each case. In MT' they are state-
ments and beliefs while in PT' they are products (or performances) and 
models. But words that are used partly in the same sense and partly in a 
different sense are used analogically and not either univocally, equivocally 
or derivatively. For terms apply univocally only when they are used in 
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exactly the same sense; they apply equivocally only when they are used in 
totally different senses; and they apply derivatively only when there is a 
primary sense and referent from which all other senses are derived. But 
since 'true' in MT' and PT' fails to apply either exactly in the same sense or 
in totally different senses, 'true' applies here neither univocally nor equivo-
cally. Nor does 'true' in these same two senses apply derivatively. 
Otherwise, under DP, the (primary) sense and referent of 'true' in one of 
these two definitions are included in the other. But this is not the case. It 
follows that in MT' and PT' 'true' applies analogically. And it is evident 
that the same analysis applies, mutatis mutalldis, to MT' and CT' on the one 
hand and to PT' and CT' on the other. 
III 
But the analysis is thus far incomplete. For consider the following prin-
ciple which may be called the principle of analogy (PA): 
PA 
For any predicate G, G is analogically predicated of a and b only 
because G is derivatively predicated of a and b by reference to c, 
of which G is primarily predicated and which is the measure of 
G ina and b. 
Examples bring out the thrust of P A. As predicated of the accidents of 
quality and activity, 'being' is used partly in the same sense and partly in a 
different sense. Though they are evidently different, the categories of quali-
ty and activity are also the same. They are both accidents. So 'being' is 
said of quality and activity analogically. But qualities and activities are 
analogically called beings only because they both depend on some other 
thing that is in the primary sense being, namely, substance. In other words, 
the only reason why being' is predicated analogically of quality and activi-
ty is that being' applies derivatively to quality and activity by reference to 
a third thing, substance, of which 'being' is primarily predicated. This 
unpacks the meaning of P A. 
Once again, health and wealth are called good partly in the same sense 
and partly in a different sense. As for sameness, they are both called good 
because they can be conducive to what is good in itself, namely, happiness. 
But since, when they are conducive to happiness, health and wealth are con-
ducive to it in different ways, they are called good in a different sense. Here 
again, PA is exemplified. For 'good' is attributed analogically to health and 
wealth only because 'good' applies derivatively to health and wealth when 
these are taken in relation to what is primarily good, namely, happiness. 
Moreover, to the extent that they are good, health and wealth depend 
on happiness just as, to the extent that they are being, qualities and activi-
ties depend on substance. Some persons are made unhappy by wealth and 
even by health. Wealth can cause anxiety and health, as Kant observes/ 
can cause pride and arrogance. But pride and arrogance work against hap-
piness. In these cases no one calls wealth or health good. This dependence 
of analogates on their ground is shown by another example. Blood and 
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urine are analogically called healthy because 'healthy' is predicated of 
blood and urine partly in the same sense and partly in a different sense. 
The sameness consists in their being signs of health in an animal while the 
difference consists in their being signs of health in a specific bodily system. 
But note that, here too, the analogates, blood and urine, depend for their 
existence on what grounds the analogy and is the primary referent of 
'healthy,' namely, an animal. 
But analogates depend on their ground logically as well as really, for 
their essence as well as for their existence. For the ground of an analogy is 
included in its analogates. You cannot define an analogate without includ-
ing its ground in the definition. This is borne out in our examples. Qualities 
and activities cannot exist apart from substance. So they really depend on 
substance. But this is because they logically depend on substance. For sub-
stance enters into the definition of quality and activity as it enters into the 
definition of any accident. Again, since, when they are good, health and 
wealth cannot exist without happiness, health and wealth, when good, 
really depend on happiness. They are found only in a happy person. But 
this is because happiness is included in their respective definitions. For 
what is meant by calling health and wealth good is just that they are con-
ducive to happiness. Finally, blood and urine really depend on an animal. 
They do not exist without animals. But this is once again due to their con-
ceptual dependence on animal. You cannot define blood or urine without 
including animal in the definition. 
Generalizing on these examples, it may now be said that in P A above, 
a and b always both really and logically depend on c, the primary refer-
ent of G. Thus, 
PA' 
When G is predicated analogically of a and b, there is a thing c 
such that, i), c is the primary referent of G, ii), c is the measure of 
G in a and b and iii), a and b really and logically depend on c. 
Armed with P A and PA', let us return to truth. As it is with 'being,' 
'good' and 'healthy' in the foregoing examples, so is it with 'true' in, say, 
MT', PT' and CT'. Under PA, 'true' is attributed analogically to statements, 
artistic productions and conventional behavior in MT', PT' and CT' respec-
tively only because they depend on some fourth thing for being called true. 
And due to this dependency, truth is found primarily in this fourth thing 
and derivatively in them. 
Here, we are the fourth thing. It is human beings that are the measure 
of truth in these three things. Though not in the sense that Kierkegaard 
means it, this may be called the domain of subjective truth. A statement is 
called morally true only because it conforms to human intellect as believ-
ing; artefacts are called true only because they conform to human intellect 
as modeling; and conventional behavior is called true because it conforms 
to human intellect as legislating. In all three cases, 'true' applies to state-
ments, artefacts and behavior analogously only because 'true' applies 
derivatively to these things taken in relation to a fourth thing in which 
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truth is primarily found. And this fourth thing is evidently a human intel-
lect. Thus, my son's polite behavior is true or correct derivatively speaking, 
i.e., only because it conforms to truth. And the truth to which it conforms is 
intellect qua maker of societal rules. 
But P A' is also exemplified in these three cases. The three analogates 
really and logically depend on our intellect in which truth is here primarily 
found. That is how PA' adds to PA and it is expressed in P A' iii) above. In 
all three cases, the analogate is something measured that really and logical-
ly depends on its measure, intellect. It is our intellect that makes the 
beliefs, models and rules that enter into the definition of statements, arte-
facts and conventional behavior, respectively. 
Thus, following DP or the logic derivative predication, it can be said 
that, when something is MT', PT' or CT' true, truth is found primarily in 
intellect and only secondarily in the statements, artefacts and human 
action, respectively, that conform to intellect. In MT' statements are called 
true only because they conform to truth in intellect; in PT' artefacts are 
called true only because they conform to truth in intellect; and in CT' 
human acts are called true only because, once again, they conform to truth 
in intellect. It is because truth is found primordially in intellect (as mea-
sure) that something is called true because it conforms to intellect as mea-
sure. The only difference is that the specific intellectual measure is different 
in each case. It is beliefs in MT' truth, ideal models in PT' truth and con-
ventional rules in CT' truth. So in the cases of MT', PT' and CT' truth, what 
is behind the analogical predication of 'true' of statements, artefacts and 
conventional behavior, i.e., intellect, is a unity-in-difference that comprises 
beliefs, Ideas and rules, respectively. 
One more thing must be said about MT', PT' and CT'. The ideal pattern 
that is conformed to in each case is final cause with respect to what con-
forms to it. And to the extent that it is, subjective truth is always teleologi-
cal. In PT' truth, the ideal model in the articifer's mind is that for the sake of 
which he constructs or performs; in CT' truth, a rule of etiquette, say, that I 
bear in mind is what I aim to fulfill when I hold a swinging door for an 
oncoming person; and in MT' truth, disclosure of a belief in my mind is 
that for the sake of which I speak or write. 
IV 
It remains only to identify the fourth thing behind the analogical use of 
'true' in ST', OT' and LT'. If it is our intellect that is behind the analogical 
use of 'true' in MT', PT' and CT', what is behind the same use of 'true' in 
ST', OT' and LT'? If it is our intellect that is the ground of subjective truth, 
what is the ground of objective truth? Assuming P A once again, there must 
here be a single fourth thing that is ground of the truth of the three ana10-
gates in this case, i.e., statements, natural things and events, just as our 
mind is ground of the truth of statements, artefacts and conventional 
behavior. And it is this fourth thing, and not the statements, natural things 
and events that in this non-human truth conform to it, that is strictly speak-
ing true. Thus, no less than statements, artefacts and human acts in MT', 
PT' and CT', statements, natural things and events in ST', OT' and L T' are 
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called true in a secondary, derived sense of the term. For since 'true' 
applies analogically to these three things, then, going by P A, truth is pri-
marily found not in these three analogates but in the ground or measure of 
the analogy. And going by PA', the three analogates in this case, just like 
the three analogates in the case of subjective truth, both really and logically 
depend for their truth on this same source or measure of their truth. But 
that means that this fourth thing enters into the definitions of statements, 
natural things and events just as, in subjective truth, our intellect enters 
into the definitions of statements, artefacts and conventional behavior. But 
the fourth thing here in objective truth is no undifferentiated measure any 
more than it is in subjective truth. It is once again a unity-in-difference. For 
what enters into the definitions of statements, things and events as their 
respective measures are truths, Ideas and laws, respectively. And these are 
many kinds of measures. But since, under PA, the fourth thing or ground of 
analogy is one thing, it follows once again that the fourth thing is a one-in-
many, a single thing that comprises three kinds of archetypes as measures. 
Stated differently, though by PA our fourth thing here is aile thing, it must 
none the less be sufficiently diversified to accommodate conformity to it on 
the part of three different things, i.e., statements, things and events. The one 
measure of truth has three dimensions that make conformity to it on the part 
of the three different analogates possible. Thus, statements are called true 
because they conforn1 to truth-measure as timeless fact, things are called true 
because they conform to truth-measure as eternal Idea and events are called 
true because they conform to truth-measure as transcendent law. It is the 
same, we saw, with subjective truth. There, statements are called true 
because they conform to truth-measure as belief, artefacts are called true 
because they conform to truth-measure as model and action is called true 
because it conforms to truth-measure as societal rule. So the measure here in 
objective truth is once again a multi-sided oneness, a unity-in-difference. 
It is evident that the fourth thing is not this time our mind. The analo-
gates in this case, i.e., statements, natural things and events, are not called 
true because they conform to truth in our intellect. Otherwise, no account 
is given of the fact that ST', OT' and LT' truth is called objective while MT', 
PT' and CT' truth is called subjective. It is also evident that the fourth thing 
here in objective truth is not caused by something else. Otherwise, it is 
measured being and not the measure of being. But then, assuming that 
something is true to the extent that it has being, the fourth thing is true 
only in a derived sense just like the statements, natural things and events 
whose truth it supposedly measures. And then the search for the ground of 
truth continues. So the question is this. What is the ground or fourth thing 
behind statements, natural things and events, all of which are objectively, if 
analogically, called true, as we are the ground or fourth thing behind state-
ments, artefacts and conventional behavior, all of which are subjectively, if 
analogically, called true? 
Ultimates like Spinoza's Substance or Hegel's Absolute serve as prima 
facie candidates for this ground. For one thing, they are independent of 
human minds. For another, their manifestations both really and logically 
depend on them. For a third, they are measure and not measured. In 
Spinoza, modes, whether finite or infinite, mediate or immediate, cannot 
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exist without Substance. Since they exist only as modifications of 
Substance, they really depend on Substance. Also, Substance is for its part 
included in modes. You cannot define mode without including Substance 
in the definition, says Spinoza. So modes logically depend on Substance. 
The same goes for the relation of the Absolute to its moments in Hege1.6 
Finite moments really depend on the Absolute and the Absolute is includ-
ed in the definition of its finite moments. When he calls the victorious 
Napoleon the World Spirit "riding through the city," Hegel turns no 
metaphor.? He really means that The World Spirit lives and moves in the 
first Emperor of France. And it is important to see that this World Spirit, 
like Spinoza's Substance, is no transcendent entity, lying beyond sense per-
ception. Platonic metaphysicians Spinoza and Hegel are not. 
But closer inspection excludes these candidates. These ultimates are not 
just inclusive unities but all-inclusive unities. But if the fourth thing by refer-
ence to which statements, natural things and events in ST', OT' and L T' are 
called true is their measure, it evidently does not include them, the measured. 
Otherwise, the measured is explained in terms of itself, making a perfect cir-
cle. But an all-inclusive ultimate either includes statements, natural things 
and events or is not all-inclusive. No all-inclusive ultimate is a measure with 
respect to the measured any more than it is creator with respect to the creat-
ed. Either designation implies dualism and dualism is incompatible with any 
all-inclusive ultimate. But the fourth thing that is here sought is the measure 
of the truth of statements, natural things and events. Therefore, it cannot be 
said that the fourth thing behind the truth of statements, natural things and 
events in ST', OT' and LT' is some all-inclusive ultimate. 
What is required, then, is an ultimate that, while it is not the whole-of-
reality, is nonetheless like the all-inclusive ultimates of philosophers like 
Hegel and Spinoza in being a unity-in-difference. For though it is one, it 
must have many aspects to make conformity to it on the part of the three 
very different analogates possible. 
That excludes the One of either Parmenides or Plotinus, Plato's Form of 
the Good and Plotinus' Nous. Take Parmenides' One. It is no unity-in-dif-
ference but pure undifferentiated unity. For all diversity for Parmenides is 
the "path of untruth" and not the "path of truth."B When one speaks of a 
being or a thing instead of Being, one speaks of what seems and not of 
what is, in the view of Parmenides. So in the case of the Parmenidean One, 
there can be no question of its being a unity-in-difference. For to be many is 
in the first instance to be illusory. One cannot speak either of the many 
being included in the One or of the One being included in the many if in 
the first place the many are not. And one can only speak of one thing's 
being the measure of the other if they are distinct. 
As for Plotinus' ineffable One, it too is undifferentiated unity. That is 
why it is called "the One." The One is cause of the unity of all things just 
because it is unity pure and simple.9 Says Plotinus, "It is because nothing is 
in the One that everything comes from it. Thus, in order that being be, it is 
necessary that the One itself be, not being, but that which begets being."'o 
Thus, being is an emanation of the One rather than being part of the One. 
When Plotinus says that the parts of the universe are all of them in the 
One," the 'in' here is not to be taken as expressing a relation of parts to a 
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whole. It is rather to be taken as expressing the relation of effects to 
ground, as, for example, we say that the fruit is in the flower. Otherwise, 
the One is not undifferentiated unity that begets multiplicity and being. 
Moreover, so far from being a free creation of the One, being is a necessary 
emanation of the One, as, in Spinoza, modes are necessary effects of 
Substance. But the difference is that while in Spinoza modes are always 
included in Substance, in Plotinus emanations or beings are viewed as 
being distinct effects or creations of the One. Emanations of the One are 
effects of the One and are no more part of the One than the world is part of 
the Hebraic-Christian God. Thus, the Plotinian One stands between 
Spinoza's Substance and the Hebraic-Christian God. Like the former but 
unlike the latter, the One's effects necessarily flow from it. But like the lat-
ter and unlike the former, the One is distinct from those effects. 
In any case, with Plotinus, determinate kinds of being are Platonic 
Ideas and they are found, as are ideas of individuals, not in the One but 
in Nous, the first emanation of the One. But this means that the One of 
Plotinus is no more a unity-in-difference like Hegel's Absolute than is the 
One of Parmenides. Rather is it more like the Absolute of Schelling's 
third and fourth periods which Hegel characterized as "the night in 
which all cows are black."12 But just for that reason, neither one of these 
Ones is identified with the fourth thing that, according to PA', is the 
unity-in-difference that is here required. 
Besides, the One is the source of all Ideas, according to Plotinus. But if, 
as he holds, Ideas are self-predicating, then Truth is true. Not only that, but 
nothing is truer than Truth, says PlotinusY And this means that truth is 
found primarily in Truth and secondarily in the exemplifications of Truth. 
But since our fourth thing that is behind the truth of statements, natural 
things and events is also the only thing that is preeminently true, it follows 
that it is not identified with the Plotinian One but, if anything, with the 
Idea of Truth. But this will not do either. For like all Ideas, the Idea of 
Truth in Plotinus is caused by the One and our fourth thing is uncaused. 
Otherwise, if a thing has truth the way it has being, our fourth thing ends 
up being derivatively rather than preeminently true. 
Nor is Plato's Idea of the Good a more promising candidate. The Good 
is in some respects the precursor of Plotinus' One. As the latter is not a 
being but beyond, above and the source of all beings, so too, Plato's Good 
is beyond, above and the source of all Ideas, including the Idea of Truth. 
It does not include Ideas as parts, attributes or moments any more than 
the One includes Ideas as its parts, attributes or moments. It is, says 
Plato, to objects of knowledge (Ideas) and to knowing them what the sun 
is to visible objects and seeing them. This analogy implies that the Ideas 
are no more real constituents of the Good than visible objects are con-
stituents of the sun. Thus, like Plotinus' One, Plato's Good transcends 
and causes, but does not include, Ideas. Instead, Ideas include it. If you 
go to define anyone of the Ideas, you must ultimately bring in the defin-
ition the super-Idea of the Good. That this is not easy (or even possible) 
to do is perhaps the deepest reason why Socrates' attempted definitions 
in the dialogues remain incomplete. 
Besides, if anything is preeminently true in Plato it is the Idea of Truth 
356 Faith and Philosophy 
and not the Good. For what could be truer than Truth itself? It may be by 
virtue of the Good that Truth or any other Idea is one and intelligible but 
Truth is true by virtue of itself. But if so, then that to which 'true' primarily 
applies is not the Good, but, if anything, the Idea of Truth. But once again 
as in the case of Plotinus, this will not do either since the Idea of Truth is no 
ultimate measure. For it is itself measured by the Good. For Truth Itself to 
be the fourth thing behind our analogates and so preeminently true, Truth 
Itself must be ultimate and unconditioned and this it is not in the philoso-
phies of Plato and Plotinus. 
As candidate for our fourth thing, Plotinus' Nous has something the 
One and the Good lack. For Nous is a unity-in-difference. For Plotinus, all 
Ideas are and must be included in Nous or Intelligence. 14 This is no aggre-
gate or accidental unity but a genuine or organic unity. Ideas are in Nous 
as my bodily organs are in me. Though they are all distinct, they share in 
the common life of Intelligence just as my different organs share in my 
life.15 This, of course, raises a difficulty as to how the Ideas remain distinct 
in Nous when according to Plotinus knowing and known, in Nous, are 
identical. 1" If Nous eternally knows Horseness and Humanity and its 
knowing these objects is identical with them, how do Horseness and 
Humanity remain distinct Ideas? 
Be that as it may, though, Nous has something else going for it. It 
escapes the circle that disqualifies Spinozistic Substance, the Hegelian 
Absolute or any other all-inclusive ultimate. Unlike them, Nous is unity-in-
difference without being all-inclusive unity or the whole-of-reality. For 
Nous is not so wide as to catch the One. As was said, Nous actually 
includes Ideas. But Nous does not include the One in the same sense of 
'include.' Not being, therefore, all-inclusive whole-of-reality, Nous escapes 
that circle, to which previous reference was made, in which something is 
measure of itself. 
But despite these advantages, Nous comes up short. The trouble with 
Nous is the same trouble that excludes the Idea of Truth. Nous is not ulti-
mate but is caused by something else, namely, the One. To that extent, 
Nous is secondary and not primary reality. True, it is the first emanation 
of the One but a first emanation is nonetheless an emanation. So once 
again, if something has truth the way it has reality, then truth in the pri-
mary sense is not found in Nous. 
v 
Evidently, then, the fourth thing by reference to which statements natur-
al things and events in ST', OT' and LT' are called true must be 1), measure 
and not measured and 2), unity-in-difference and 3), preeminent reality 
that is not the whole-of-reality. What satisfies these conditions? What 
qualifies as the fourth thing that is behind the three analogates in objective 
truth as we are behind the three analogates in subjective truth? 
One thing that does is Aquinas' God.17 As the source of truth in OT', ST" 
and L T', Aquinas' God meets all three conditions. To take OT' first, natural 
things are called true, says Aquinas, only because they conform to truth in 
God's intellect, just as artefacts are called true only because they conform 
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to truth in our intellect. The many Ideas in God's intellect after which nat-
ural things are patterned correspond to the models in the artisan's mind 
after which artefacts are made. Each intellect, ours and God's, is thus a 
unity-in-difference. Not only that, but God's intellect is measure and not 
measured in producing natural things just as, in fabricating artistic cre-
ations, the artist is measure and not measured. Thus, OT' on the objective 
side parallels PT' on the subjective side. The difference is that God is in no 
sense measured while human artisans, though they measure their artefacts, 
are in other respects measured. And just to the extent that Aquinas' God is 
unmeasured measure and also distinct from the world It measures, It is 
preeminent reality without being the-whole-of-reality. 
Aquinas' God satisfies the same three conditions in ST' truth. According 
to Aquinas, God is behind ST' truth. This may not at first seem to be the 
case. For facts in the world are the measure of the truth of statements and 
judgments, even in the view of Aquinas. 'Grass is green' is true just 
because grass is green. Yet, as it exists eternally in the mind of God, the fact 
that grass is green is a truth. And this truth is the measure of the fact in the 
world and not the other way around. God knows grass is green not 
because grass is green but grass is green because God knows grass is 
green. Otherwise, God's knowledge is measured by facts in the world. So 
while not denying that on one level our statements are made true by facts 
in the world, Aquinas holds that, on a deeper level, the truth of statements 
is ultimately measured by a timeless truth in the mind of God. And just to 
that extent statements and judgments are improperly and secondarily true. 
They are called true derivatively speaking, i.e., only because they conform 
to truth in something else. And that something else is God. 'K This is not to 
deny that, from another standpoint, judgments, at least, are also properly 
speaking true. Anything that is not called true only because it is related to 
truth in something else is properly speaking true. And in Aquinas' view 
judgments are not called true only because they are related to truth in 
something else. They are also called true because they correspond to facts 
in the world. And to the extent that they do, they are properly or straight-
forwardly true. For since facts are beings and not truths,19 judgments that 
are called true because they correspond to facts are not called true because 
they are related to truth. And so they are not to that extent called true 
derivatively. Yet, even here judgments are secondarily, if properly, true 
since their truth is measured by something else, namely, facts. 
From this it is clear that, as source of truth in ST', Aquinas' God satisfies 
the three conditions that have been specified. To the extent that many 
truths subsist in God as unmeasured measure of the truths in our intellect, 
Aquinas' God is a unity-in-difference that is unmeasured measure. And 
since, for Aquinas, the truth of judgment that is here measured is some-
thing distinct from and not part of God, the latter is not only unmeasured 
unity-in-difference but also unidentified with the whole-of-reality. 
Finally, Aquinas' God satisfies the same three conditions in L T' truth. 
For in the view of Aquinas, God is behind LT' truth just as He is behind 
OT' and ST' truth. He believed that law is a kind of plan or design directing 
things to an end. As such, law is primarily in minds. Thus, the actions of 
citizens are directed to their appropriate ends by an overall plan or design 
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of the state in the mind of the governor. And this political plan or design is 
a kind of conventional law. But there are also natural laws. These laws are 
not made by humans and they direct the activities of natural things to their 
ends. Thus, a plan or law of nature in a fetus directs the activities of the 
fetus to its end, a fully-developed human being. But like the plan or law of ' 
the governor, the law of nature of the fetus or of any other natural thing is 
primarily in mind and secondarily in matter. As the law of a governor is 
found primarily in the governor's mind and secondarily in the actions of 
obedient citizens, so too, a natural law is found primarily in God's mind 
and secondarily in the conforming activities of a natural object such as a 
fetus. That is why Aquinas says that natural law is just the expression of 
the eternal law in God. And so it is that law, for Aquinas, is both transcen-
dent and immanent, transcendent in its primary sense in mind and imma-
nent in a secondary sense in the natural things and activities that follow the 
law of mind. 
Here again, as source of truth in LT', Aquinas' God meets our three con-
ditions. To the extent that many laws subsist in God as unmeasured mea-
sure of the activities in natural things that conform to them, Aquinas' God 
is unity-in-difference that is measure without being measured. And since, 
for Aquinas, the measured natural activities are distinct and not part of 
their measuring source, the latter, God, is not only unmeasured unity-in-
difference but also (as in OT' and ST') unmeasured unity-in-difference that 
is unidentified with the whole-of-reality. 
But right here it may be objected that the natural laws of Aquinas are 
teleological. But everyone knows that, beginning with Galileo, purposive 
natural laws were abandoned in favor of the quantitative natural laws of 
modern science. But if, since Galileo, natural laws are mathematical formu-
lae expressing relations of uniformity either within or between things 
instead of being prearranged plans directing the repetitious behavior of 
things, then it is unnecessary to posit a transcendent mind as the source of 
natural uniformity. If natural laws are not to begin with plans, there is no 
need of a cosmic planner. But then the source of L T' truth need not be God. 
But the answer to this objection is that it is simply irrelevant. Whether or 
not there are teleological natural laws makes no difference to our argu-
ment. To review that argument, in ST', OT' and LT' 'true' is predicated ana-
logically of statements, things and activities, respectively. For these analo-
gates are called true partly in the same sense and partly in a different 
sense. But if so, then PA' must be invoked. And according to PA', there 
must be a single fourth thing behind these analogates on account of which 
they are called true and in which truth is primarily found. And it is on that 
fourth thing that the three analogates depend for their essence and exis-
tence. Recall Aristotle's example. Because quality, quantity and activity are 
called being analogically, there is a fourth thing on account of which they 
are called being and on which they depend for what they are and for the 
fact that they are. And this is substance. Therefore, just because truth is 
found analogically in ST', OT' and L T', it follows by PA' both that there is 
some measure of that truth in which truth is primarily found and that the 
three analogates depend on that measure both to be and to be what they 
are. Since this measure of truth is true in the primary sense, it is unmea-
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sured truth. This is shown by the fact that, while it is included in the defini-
tion of the truth of its analogates, the truth of its analogates is not included 
in its truth, any more than the being of quality, quantity or activity is 
included in the being of substance. Moreover, just because it is included in 
its analogates, making them what they are, and the latter, being different 
things, have different kinds of measures, our single fourth thing includes 
three kinds of archetypes. It is thus a unity-in-difference. Yet, to avoid the 
circle of something being measure of itself, it is unity-in-difference that, 
though unmeasured, is unidentified with the whole-of-reality. And it is 
evident that the foregoing argument stands or falls independently of 
whether 'natural law' in L T' is construed teleologically or not. 
A second objection is that the simplicity of God is compromised if 
truths, Ideas and laws are included in God as specific measures of state-
ments, things and events. To this, Aquinas replies that Ideas (and, by 
extension, truths and laws) are in God not as likenesses by which He under-
stands but as that which is understood by Him.2o In other words, to say 
Ideas, truths and laws are in God is just to say that God knows Himself. 
And since God knows perfectly, God knows Himself in all the ways in 
which He is knowable, including being known as imitable by creatures. 
Since, therefore, by saying many Ideas, truths and laws are in God is meant 
nothing else but that God knows Himself as participable by creatures, then 
saying that many Ideas, truths and laws are in God is not inconsistent with 
affirming that God is simple. 
Finally, the specific measures in objective truth (Le., Ideas, truths and 
laws) are final causes, just as are the three measures in subjective truth. 
This follows from their being pre-existing standards in God just as, in MT', 
PT' and CT', beliefs, models and conventional rules are pre-existing stan-
dards in us. For a final cause has the nature of a pre-existing plan, model 
or law in mind after which something is made, occurs or is done. But this 
exactly fits the description of what Aquinas calls a divine exemplar, be it 
an exemplar as Idea or an exemplar as law. And such exemplars are in the 
view of Aquinas final causes of all things and activities in the world.21 
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and it is not the case that there is something else, y, such that y is the measure 
of the truth of x. Finally, truth is found secondarily in x iff there is something 
else, y, such that y is the measure of the truth of x. See St. Thomas Aquinas, De 
Vcritate, Q. 1., a. 4. 
19. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I,Q.16,a.l, reply to obj.3. 
20. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, Q. ]5, a. 2. 
21. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiac, I-II, Q. 93, a. 1. 
